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The December 19 81 imposition of martial law in Poland and
its lifting in 19 8 3 have been indicative of the turmoil that
has existed in Poland over the. last few years. As the
largest member geographically and demographically of the
Warsaw Pact, the domestic unrest has placed the reliability
of the Polish armed forces as Warsaw Pact members in
question.
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considered reliable members of the Warsaw Pact in foreseeable
circumstances, despite some qualifications. This conclusion
is reached through a review of the postwar history of the
Polish armed forces and an analysis of other pertinent
factors, including the burden of governing and the economy's
effect on the armed forces. Various other issues favoring





III» ARKED FORCES . 19
IV:. POLISH ARKED FORCES IN CRISES 38
V, THE BURDEN OF GOVERNIKG 4 8
YI, BONAPARTISM 54
VII. ECONOMICS 6
V:iII, THE CHURCH 6 7
IX, FACTORS FAVORING RELIABILITY 5 9
X, FACTORS OPPOSING RELIABILITY 7 2
XI, CONCLUSIONS 74
E^ NOTES 77
IJvriTIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 8 3

I. INTRODUCTION
As the present military regime has enacted an apparent
lifting of martial law an.d at the same time Lech Walesa and
his followers attempt to express dissatisfaction with social
conditions, the question of the reliability of the Polish
Armed Forces as members of the Soviet directed Warsaw Pact
inevitably arises.
The reliability of the Polish Armed Forces is of
inestimable importance to the Soviet Union, The Polish armed
forces are the most significant part of the Northern Tier
forces in the Warsaw Pact. Poland, the largest geographically
and demographically of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members,
and situated astride the traditional invasion route from the
West to Russia has by its position and size been considered
of. vital importance to Russian security both by the czars and
the Soviet rulers. Four great post-medieval attempts to
conquer Russia came from or through Poland: the Polish
capture of the Kremlin in 1610, the invasion by Sweden's King
Charles XII in 1709, the invasion by Napoleon^s Grand Army
1in 1812, and Hitler ^s invasion of 1941, Evaluating the
reliability of the Poles must then be undertaken with the
fact in mind that Poland, due to her size, location and
population, is critical in many respects to the Soviet
Northern Tier military posture.

It is the contention of this thesis that the Polish
armed forces are indeed reliable members of the Warsaw Treaty
Organiz-ation and furthermore that they would respond in a
positive fashion to participate in joint combat operations
against a force deemed hostile to the Warsaw Pact.
In. any political analysis existing preconceptions
ij;iflaence a research effort. The Polish case is no different.
The opinion of some in the west to the effect that the Polish
armed forces harbor tendencies to seek Western support may
well be unfounded and illusory. Poland is firmly implanted
as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, As General
Jaruz.elski stated upon his declaration of martial law in
December 19 81: "The Polish-^Soviet alliance is and will remain
the cornerstone of the Polish raison d'et at, the guarantee
2
of the inviolability of our borders," Poland *s military
personnel and equipment are unequivocally tied to the
Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization's warfare doctrine and defense
posture, as will be discussed.
Furthermore, Poland has little choice in the matter.
Poland is the most important piece of real estate vital to
the security of the Soviet Union, The words of General
Jaruzelski indicate that this is fully understood by the
ruling Polish military elite,
^^Brotherhood-in-arms with the Soviet Army, allied ties with
the Warsaw Treaty states-^r^this is a historic achievement
of our Army and of our people, the foundation of security
and peaceful development of socialist Poland,"^

The Polish regime realizes that a total departure of Poland
in terms of allegiance or membership in the Warsaw Treaty
Organization will not be allowed by the Soviets. The Soviets
would prevent such a departure with armed intervention, if
necessary.
In order to support the basic contention that the Polish
armed forces should be considered reliable members of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization, an approach will be utilized
that encompasses the following major areas: an applicable
working definition of reliability will be established; a
review of the history of the armed forces will be undertaken
i
and analysis of the behavior of armed forces in crises
will be reviewed i the burden of governing, the problem of the
economy, and the role of the Church will be discussed; various
additional factors will be summarized. This admittedly eclectic
and selective approach consisting of a treatment of these
aforementioned areas has been chosen for the following
reasons.
First, the concept of reliability must be defined in
specific terms to allow analysis to preceed. Dale Herspring's
definition of Eastern European military reliability offers a
framework for a point of orderly departure in examining the
contention of the basic thesis that the Polish armed forces
are reliable members of the Warsaw Pact, It is vitally
important to establish to what degree and in which
circumstance the term reliability is to be applied in the
8

contention of the thesis. A review of the establishment
of the Polish armed forces after World War II will then
follow to attempt to understand how significant the Russian
presence was at the very start in influencing the Polish
armed forces to be reliable members of the Soviet camp.
History over the past World War II period will also provide
a basis to construct a pattern of just how the Polish armed
forces have performed in various crisis situations. This
crisis behavior will provide an important historical view-
point from which to project the reliability of the Polish
armed forces in future crisis or conflicts.
The next task of the analysis is to examine the burden
assumed by the Polish military when it took over all the
functions of government. The goal will be to ascertain if
this burden of governing has affected the military institution
in Poland, specifically in its ability to conduct combat
operations. In addition, the state of the Polish economy
will be reviewed in terms of effects in the reliability of
the armed forces, A review also of the effects of the Church
on reliability will be addressed.
Lastly a list of various additional relevant factors will
be discussed. These factors either support or fail to
support the argument for reliability.
In conclusion, an attempt will be made to synthesiz^e all
the factors bearing on the reliability question to suggest

support for the contention of the positive reliability of
the Polish Armed Forces in the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
In introducing what this research study will accomplish
it is equally important to acknowledge that it is by no
means an all-inclusive approach to the issue. The fine
lines of distinction between loyalty and allegiance will
be covered broadly under the reliability issue. The actions
of the Soviets and their perceptions of the Polish situation
can not be completely analyzed in such a short research
effort. Furthermore a precise scenario of Polish and Warsaw
Treaty Organization confrontation with NATO will not be
undertaken. The main thrust then of this research effort
will be from the point of view of the Polish armed forces





The first task in dealing with the issue of reliability
is to define it. Reliability has different connotations
for different people. Therefore it is essential that a
definition be established which will be consistently used
throughout the research of the subject. For the purpose
of this study, to define the concept in a military sense,
reliability can be broken down into two components. The
first component can be labeled a condition of reliability,
i.e. describing under what conditions a force can be
depended upon to execute. its orders. The second and key
component is a standard of reliability, i,e,, describing
just to whom a force owes its allegiance—whether, in the
case of the Polish armed forces, it would be their leaders,
their government, the Warsaw Pact on the Soviet Union. This
standard of reliability closely borders on a type of loyalty
which encompasses the scope of reliability as it applies to
a military establishment. The conditions of reliability
will be discussed first.
Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes in their study of Eastern
European Armies offer four categories that may be considered
under the title of conditions of reliability. These
categories provide a convenient and well thought out framework
11

for an analysis of the reliability issue. From the start
this research effort will adopt the terminology and basic
points of departure of Herspring and Volgyes and apply this
method to the Polish armed forces. The four categories that
these authors establish are:, internal offensive, internal
defensive, external defensive and external offensive.
In the internal offensive category Herspring states that
it refers to the probability that significant segments of the
professional officer corps will act against the party leader-
ship by attempting a coup e'^etat on try to oppose it by
5forcing military interests on an unwilling party leadership.
This category is of little use in the Polish case since
the military did not effect a coup d^etat. The army did not
deprive the ruling communist party of its powers non attempt
to change the existing political system. In Poland a
weakened Party apparatus was replaced by military members
gradically assuming areas of greater responsibility in the
government until the leadership of the government, the party
and the military became one and the same. The Army in
Poland didn'^t (in Herspring *^s sense) act in an interval
offensive role but, in essence, just outright assumed all
essential party leadership functions, A coup d'etat did
not take place
,
The second condition- category is that of internal defensive
reliability, i.e., the^ notion of intent to defend the incumbent




major applicability to the present Polish situation. The
ruling military authority, acting as the regime in Poland,
has and will continue to use various segments of the Armed
Forces to provide necessary political stability and security
to sustain itself in power. This assertion will be
discussed further in terms of the standard of reliability of
the Polish forces as demonstrated in the actions of the
Polish forces in various crisis scenarios over the years.
Suffice it to say at this time, that the internal defensive
reliability is essential in discussing Polish Armed Forces
in the external categories of reliability that follow. With-
out aL functioning positive internal defensive reliability,
under present conditions of military rule, any notion of
external defensive or offensive reliability would be
seriously undermined. In other words, if the present mili-
tary rulers, who seem to hold a consensus in Polish military
leadership, as far as the West can see, could not rally the
Armed Forces in their defense, then, they would be ill-put to
organiz.e and lead a national external defensive effort of
an.y sort. Furthermore, very basically, if the present
military leadership did not have the backing of its armed
forces it would cease to exist. As will be discussed in a
later portloin. of this research effort, the governing military




In the third condition category, that of external
defensive, Herspring refers to the probability that the
armed forces will defend the state against external threats.
These threats originate from sources outside Poland and will
be discussed in three scenarios.
With the military elite of Poland currently holding
governmental power the previous problems of conflicting orders
and growing military autonomy from the civilian party
squabbles must be significantly decreased. Orders now flow
directly to the armed forces from their leaders. While the
elimination of this problem is a positive contribution to
the response of the armed forces it does not insure total
compliaxLce with orders vis a vis an external threat. It is
in the external threat area more than any other category
mentioned that the attitudes of society at large play a
vital role. It is in this case that the role of the conscript
plays a deciding factor. The conscript may have to go out
at home on abroad and die for his country. This is very
different for the conscript *^s role in the previously
mentioned internal categories. In order to risk the lives
of their sons and possibly bring to Poland the hardships of
war which are so familiar from the past, the populace, as a
whole who basically the conscript represents, must view the
governing regime as defending the country *^s national interest
7
in standing up to an exteri^al threat.
l^

It is in this first of two external categories that the
initial question of the whole analysis first finds some
provacative issues which will support the premise of the
reliability of the Polish armed forces as Warsaw Pact members.
There are three basic scenarios in the external defensive
p
category. They are: defense against attack by other Warsaw
Pact neighbors, defense against an attack by the Soviet Union
alone, and defense against an attack by NATO. The last
case, for purposes of this study, is the only one that will
be considered in attempting to judge Poland ^s reliability as
a Warsaw Pact member. The basic issue is whether Poland
will join Warsaw Pact force fe and respond to an attack by NATO
There are three factors that have some bearing on this
issue. First, a survey of Polish armed forces actions in
certain crises situations since World War II, which will be
reviewed later as part of this research effort, will
indicate that, in 1956 and in 1980, the threat of Polish
armed resistance was a factor in deterring a Soviet invasion.
This shows that the Polish armed forces are capable of
staging a resistance effort to an external threat. Secondly
the Polish armed forces are trained in and fully adopt the
Warsaw Pact coalition warfare doctrine which embodies joint
combat operations by its members. Therefore, the basic and
central training done by the Polish armed forces supports
a joining with other Warsaw Pact members in combat. The




armed forces, is that NATO is a defensive alliance and that
the likelihood of an offensive move by NATO forces against
Poland is nonexistent. In summary then the category of
external defensive reliability contributes as an indicator
which will determine overall Polish armed forces reliability
as a Warsaw Pact member, albeit in a minor sense.
In the fourth condition category, that of external-offen-
sive, Herspring refers to the willingness of the military to
support the regime in an offensive campaign against other
9
countries. As in the previous external category the
identification of the act of aggression with the national
interest becomes crucial in attaining a success. The backing
by the populace will determine the long term effectiveness of
the armed forces which is again primarily conscripts.
Herspring outlines four major categories of this offensive
type action, namely: attack on another Warsaw Pact country,
attack on a neutral, attack on the USSR and attack on NATO.
First of all with the amount of Soviet divisions in East
Germany and surrounding Poland from the East a repeat of the
Polish attack of 1920 on the USSR is improbable and will not
be considered. The joining of Poland in an attack against
another Warsaw Pact member will be treated under the review
of Polish Armed Forces action in crisis later in this analysis
The only time Poland displayed this capability was in 196 8
against Czechoslovakia, The crux of the issue really is,
will Poland join Warsaw Pact, forces in an attack against a
16

neutral or NATO? This is the real issue, in fact, of this
whole thesis. Therefore, this external offensive condition
of reliability will be used as a chief case indicator in
this study.
The second component of reliability is a standard of
reliability, i,e,, for whom will the Polish armed forces
be reliable. This standard of reliability borders on basic
loyalty. For purposes of this study there appear to be three
cases namely: reliability to military leaders, reliability
to the government, reliability to the Warsaw Pact, Reliability
to the Warsaw Pact implies reliability to the Soviet Union.
The Warsaw Pact provides a buffer zone and first line of
defense for the Soviet Union. Soviet security is the basis
for the Warsaw Pact. A review of Polish armed forces during
crisis situations will show a distinct obediance to their
local military leaders.
Since the Polish army is the government, at the present
time, the question of reliability to the government, while a
worthy question to pursue over the years is not in doubt at
the present time.
In February 19 81 when General Jaruzelski assumed the
premiership, generals assumed other prominent government
11positions. With the martial law declaration on December
13, 1981 the all-military Council of Rational Salvation
eclipsed the Party Politburo* "Militariz.ation" of Party




civilians by military appointees proceeded. For example
7 of the 4 7 regional governors were generals, and officers
12assumed a number of key regional party positions. With
Jaruz^elski as its head the Military Council for National
Salvation consisted of three lieutenant generals, one
admiral, nine major generals, two generals, three colonels,
13
oiie lieutenant colonel and one lieutenant commander.
At the present time the Jaruzelski regime has demonstrated
it is in control, ergo, a reliability of sorts must exist
among the armed forces for the government and its leader.
The more important and extremely difficult question to
answer is how reliable the Polish armed forces are as Warsaw
Pact members. This then will be the main thrust of further
analysis
.
In partial summary in attempting to define reliability
as an issue to pursue in the Polish case, the external
offensive and defensive conditions as applied to the





Before venturing further in analyzing the reliability
question of the Polish armed forces, it is appropriate to
briefly examine these armed forces to understand how they
were formed in the initial post-World War II era and how
their development progressed. This historical approach will
offer indications and insights which will be important for
judging and estimating the Polish armed forces performance
today as members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
The origins of the "^Polish People ^s Army" created in 194 5
can be traced principally to the First and Second Polish
mArmxes organized by Moscow on Soviet territory in 194 3.
It is significant to note that, even at the very start of
today 's Polish armed forces, they had a solid pro-Soviet base
and were born on Russian soil. These two Polish armies were
dominated by Soviet officers and, by the end of the war, one-
third of their officers were Soviets. In 194 8 with the purge
of Gomulka by Stalin, the elimination of any nationalist ically
oriented Polish military leaders took place. Thus the Soviet
leadership directly selected a Polish military leadership
with a pro-Soviet stance. General Waclaw Komar and several
others who would return to the scene with Gomulka in 19 56
IS
were among the purged. In the following year major Soviet-




as a stronger emphasis was put in integrating Soviet officers
into all aspects of the Polish armed forces. The overall
effect, of course, was the overwhelmingly to further shape
the Polish armed forces in a reliable mold for the Soviet Union,
Soviet Marshal Rokossowski became Defense Minister and
Commander in Chief in 1949; subsequently the posts of chief
of the general staff, commander of the ground forces, heads
of all service branches, and commanders of all the military
17districts were filled by Soviet officers. The basic
development was that the Polish Army became an extra-national
force which was directly subordinated to the Soviet High
Command. As A. Ross Johnson states: "The USSR decreed
organizational changes in the Polish army; military organi-
zation, training patterns, doctrine tactics, and even uniforms
18
were modified to conform to the Soviet model." Although
a member of the Polish Party Politburo, Marshall Rokossowski
19took his orders from Moscow. The Soviets had established
themselves as firmly influencing and controlling the Polish
armed forces
.
The next significant change in the Polish armed forces
occurred in 19 56 with the return to power of Gomulka. The
resistance effort mustered by certain elements of the armed
forces, as will be discussed in a later part of this thesis,
played a significant role in the decision of the Soviet
leadership to allow Gomulka to return. With Gomulka *s
return to power the Polish armed forces were, in fact,
20

renationalized. Marshal Rokossowski and his entourage of
Soviet officers were recalled by Khrushchev. Many original
members of the People ^s Army, who had been purged with
Gomulka in the late forties, now returned to military
leadership positions. These appointees included: General
General Marian Spychalski as defense minister. General
^ygmunt Duszynski, deputy chief of staff; General Janusz
Zarz.ycki, head of MPA; General Adam Uziembo , Chief of
Military-Political Academy and General Jerzy Fonkowicz, head
of the defense ministry. All had fought in the People's Army
14
and had been side-tracked under Stalin, In addition
Generals Bielecki and Komar and Admiral Wisniewski were
named to head the Air Force, the Internal Forces and the
Navy respectively; all three had commanded units that had
mobiliz.ed to resist the Soviets in 1956.
The renationaliz-ation of the armed forces became manifest
as the professional military leadership began to reassert
its preregotives . Specifically, as A, Ross Johnson describes
"^The focus, of political activity in the armed forces
shifted from the political apparatus, discredited in the
Stalinist era, to Party organizations which reformist
elements often initially dominated. The result was to
reduce Party influence in the military establishment
because only a minority of soldiers and half the officer
corps were subject to Party discipline, and because
Party organizations in the military had less impact on
activities of the professional commanders than did the
military "^s political apparatus , ^'^
An early indication of the military asserting its
prerogatives was the establishnient in February 19 57 of
21

a Military Council in the Ministry of National Defense as a
formal advisory body bringing together, under the chairmanship




Although the hierarchy of the Polish armed forces was
restaffed with Polish officers, the military structure model
and the actual doctrine of the Soviet Union still provided
a basis for the Polish armed forces. The Gomulka regime's
commitment that Poland would remain a firm ally to the
Soviet Union as well as Poland's inclusion in the Soviet bloc
resulted in the emulation of Soviet military doctrine as it
22pertains to the threat to the Soviet bloc in Europe.
At this time, however, in the Soviet Union, military
science was changing. Specifically, the statis Stalin-
generated concepts of warfare in Europe were being restructured
to reflect an offensive posture of Soviet bloc forces in the
23European theater. At the same time that Soviet military
science was transitioning the elite of the Polish armed forces
were developing strong professional relationship's with the
Soviet military. A major exchange of military experience and
knowledge was taking place between the Polish Armed forces
and the Soviets as manifested in exercises and training.
This period in the history of the Polish armed forces can be
characterized as one when actual bonds of professional
dependence were created and strengthened between the Soviet
and Polish military. A. Ross Johnson illustrates these
22

emergi^ig bonds in his research regarding the Polish
development of a coalition warfare doctrine. He writes:
"Attuned to the rethinking of Soviet strategy then
underway, in the late 19 50 *s Polish military specialists
evaluated, in a series of military journal articles and
books, a doctrine of coalition warfare which reflected
Poland^ s military participation in the Warsaw Pact and
was thus largely Soviet-derived, but which embodied a
Polish component ."24
What is significant further is that this doctrine was
formulated in the late 19 50 "^s and as such preceded the
multilateral Warsaw Pact field exercises which were held
formally in 1961 for the first time. As Johnson states,
"the doctrine suggests an earlier Soviet decision to place
greater reliance on East European forces in military planning
25for European contingencies than is usually assumed."
Thus, even though the personal domination of the Polish
armed forces by the Soviets had been terminated, there
remained and blossomed a strong professional relationship
between the two. The Poles had established themselves as
active reliable members of the Soviet camp.
Material modernization followed and accompanied the
professional resurgence among the Polish armed forces.
This massive material improvement also was to be
Soviet-oriented
.
The late sixties and early seventies were to see the
Polish operational Army develop into fifteen divisions , Two
of these divisions are unique, elite, special purpose units:
a s.ea. landing division and an airborne assault division.
23

The ground forces have some 3,800 tanks including T-5U-/55/6M-
and T-34. The Navy includes a naval airstation regiment with
sixty combat aircraft. The Air Force has some 725 combat
aircraft, mostly MIG 21 and. 17, but including 2 8 SU-2
modern fighter bombers. Table I relfects selected data on
2 Rpresent Polish military capabilities.
The aforementioned two areas of major advancement of the
Polish armed forces, namely in material and doctrine, also
occassioned two areas of dissatisfaction in the mid sixties
among the Polish officer corps. This dissatisfaction arose
from the fact that the Polish military lagged behind the
Soviet army in moderniza.tion and especially, that Soviet
clLent «-states in the Middle East received new weapon systems
before they were made available to Poland.
A review of several sources indicates the status of the
27Soviet Arab allies vis a vis Poland as follows:
ARAB ALLIES POLAND
Tanks: T5M:/55 Same not received until
Received early sixties mid sixties
Missiles: SA2 SA2
Received early sixties received mid sixties
Aircraft: MIG 21 MIG 21
Received approximately at same time but various versions
appear.
In 1967 the issue of Poland, lagging behind the Arab
clients in receipt of military hardware came to a head when
there was considerable admiration in the Polish military
24:
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establishment for Israeli equipment and tactics in the
2!
six-day war and disparagement of Soviet equipment and tactics.
Although Poland was catching up in acquiring the various combat
material that the Soviets had given first to their Mid-East
clients, the Israelis had shown that the very equipment and
tactics that the Soviets supplied could be defeated. Radio
Free Europe Research of June 196 7 revealed Defense Minister
Spychalski alluding to criticism of Soviet equipment in a
series of meetings. It was in the area of Air Defense
weapons where the strongest resentment was displayed.
Following the expression of such sentiments the entire leader-
29 ...
ship of the Air Defense Command was ousted. In addition, m
the previously mentioned area of coalition doctrine develop-
ment, the Soviets have continually failed to publically . .
recognize the Polish contribution, thus providing a second
area of disgruntlement among Polish military elites.
In general, the period 196 to 1973 was characterized by
instability among the senior Polish military leaders. A. Ross
Johnson suggests the following three reasons for the insta-
30bility. The first reason was Gomulka's own back-tracking
from the spirit of the Polish October of 19 56, Gomulka
sought to de-emphasize the nationalism that put him back in
power. His swing toward the Soviets transmitted a signal to
the Polish military not to proceed too far astray from their
Soviet counterparts. Secondly, there arose partisan
2S

fa.ctional struggle for power within the ranks of the military
elite. The conflicting themes of party allegiance, pro-
nationalistic tendencies, pure professional military ideals
and anti-semitism all served to be sources of factional
division. Thirdly, the Soviets themselves sought to
discourage nationalistic tendencies.
It was in the 197 3 timeframe that Polish military elite
started to experience stability. The military leaders who
came to power at that time were a new group. They were not
characterized by any prewar communist experience but were
members who fought in the Polish army formed in the USSR
during World War II. A, Ross Johnson describes these leaders
as having followed professional rather than political career
31paths. They had almost universally received advanced
military training in the USSR. This new officer corps is
characterized with a profile of "Polishness" . Only a handful
of Russian Poles remain among the ranks, Poles of Jewish
origin have been eliminated entirely, A full 81 percent of all
officers come from worker and peasant families with 8 5
32percent party members. In addition, the educational level
of the officer and enlisted ranks has increased significantly.
33
Table II depicts this fact.
One figure who typifies this new breed of Polish military
elite is General Jaruz-elski* His biographical sketch gives
some insight into his profile ^ Although some analysts like
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political general, there are others, like Richard Spielman,
34
who think otherwise* When the Soviets invaded Poland in
19 3 9 the then 16 -year old Jaruz:elski, his family, and
hundreds of thousands of other Poles were deported to Soviet
central Asia, There he spent three years as an "involuntary
35guestworker"^, Jaruzelski was born to a family of the
gentry and had been receiving a classical education at a
prestigious monastery boarding school. As a result of this
deportation, Jaruzelski was never to see his family again.
Jaruz-elski fought as a junior officer in the Soviet-sponsored
Second Polish Army during World War II, He was promoted to
major general at age 3 3 and his subsequent military career
consisted exclusively of line positions until his unusual
promotion in 196 from division commander to MPA chief; by
virtue of the latter position he became a Party Central
Committee member in 1964, In 196 5 he became chief of the
3 6general staff. Thus it can be seen that General
Jaruz-elski has a background that might imply both pro and
anti-Soviet tendencies. Two implications here are worthy of
note. First, General Jaruzelski, to a great extent typifies
the senior military elite in Poland with a background that
is distinctly pro Soviet in his professional education,
operational experience and exposure. Secondly, one can pose
an argument that he would harbor some latent anti-Soviet
feelings due to his unfortunate eaprly childhood experience.
29

In further assessing the Polish Armed Forces it is
significant to note a distinction that is made between those
armed forces of the operational army dedicated to external
defense and those forces dedicated to a defense of national
territory. This defense of national territory idea
ostensibly revolves around the tenet for the need to prepare
37Poland against massive nuclear attack. These forces
include an air defense group, civil defense units, internal
security units and certain territorial units. In addition
to a defensive task, various units have a second explicit
function of quelling internal unrest. It is estimated that
the so-called ZOKO forces, which is only one of these
3 8
security units, numbers between 80,000 and 10 0,000 alone.
The secondary purpose of these security units is politically
significant in that these units can and have been used to
support the regime in power. Later in this thesis, when a
review of Polish Armed Forces in crisis situations is under-
taken, the use of these security units will be addressed. In
essence, however, when a reliability analysis of Polish
armed forces is undertaken, the aforementioned security
related units must be considered separately from the
operational army. In general, these security types are
specially trained, well-paid, and receive special privileges.
39
These security forces include aJLl the units in. Figure 1,
30

Kinistry of Internal Affairs
^fistula Motorized Police Auxiliary Security Frontier
Brigades Police Forces Police Service Defense
(Elite Units (Militia) Forces Forces
Security
Units)
Source: Compiled by A. Ross Johnson from Polish media
references
Figure 1, Organization of Polish Internal Security Forces
(key components)
Since the security forces play a significant role in
providing the implementation of the military regime's
governing policy on occasion, in terms of directly con-
fronting the populace, it is worthwhile then to briefly
examone the main element of these forces, namely ZOMO , and
to understand its creation and motivation, ZOMO which,
loosely translated, comes out to be motorized police units,
has been in existence since 194 5. ZOMO includes two types
of soldiers: (1) prisoners offered the option of joining
ZOMO instead of serving a sentence for criminal offenses;
(2) soldiers who have completed two years of military
service, mainly from the countryside with poor prospects
in civilian, life, poorly educated, and of generally low
31

moral and political levels. One of the perquisites granted
these individuals is preference on housing assignments for
their families.
Although it would seem at first glance that these ZOMO
forces constitute merely a brainless goon squad, this would
be an erroneous assumption* An indication of this is that the
former ZOMO head was a former Wehrmacht soldier who was
taken prisoner by the Russians and trained by the NKVD in
Russia after the war. Today, ZOMO is one of the best equipped
41police forces in the world, ZOMO'^s current officers are
graduates of higher military schools. Most of the officers
have had two prior years of resular army service and are
closely scrutinized by political officers before they are
42
selected for ZOMO assignment. There is even a selective
process at the conscript level to insure only prospective
reliable party types end up with assignment in the ZOMO
force
.
The operational army, on the other hand, consists of
basically two classes-—the officers, a by-and-large profes-
sional corps, and the enlisted portion—seventy three per
cent (according to the ISS 19 83) of which consists of
43 ....
conscripts. In this regard, it is interesting to note
that according to the ISS 1983, 59% of the total Polish
armed forces consists of conscripts. The aforementioned
facts then, imply that the motivation for the security
forces can be, to a large extent, their material rewards,
32

The officer class in the operational armed forces also finds
many pri\rileges and functions as an elite group. The officers
must, however, motivate an armed force of mostly involuntary
temporary soldiers who typify a cross section of the Polish
populace.
One determinant from which one can arrive at conclusions
concerning the performance of any armed forces is training.
The training that is available to scrutinize of the Warsaw
Pact forces is the formal training of officers and the
exercise training conducted by officers and troops in the
field. In the area of formal officer training, promotion
to the highest military commands of East Europe is restricted
to the elite who pass through the three levels of the
alliance 's education system. The third level of this
system is the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow,
It is here where the final education of an aspiring colonel
takes place. These graduates are inducted into a greater
socialist officer corps bound together by school ties,
trained in a common military doctrine addressed to the
conduct of joint missions, and accustomed to using Russian as
45
the language of military communication.
Christopher Jones further argues that, in effect, this
Warsaw Treaty Organization educa.tlon system detaches the high
ranking East European officers, from the local defense
ministries, and. binds them to the Soviet defense ministry.
Jones theoriz-es that the very admissions processes to Soviet
33

academies is used to identify those East European officers
who accept Soviet hegemony over the Warsaw Alliance.
Furthermore the Voroshilov program itself denies senior
Warsaw Treaty Organization officers training in any strategy
other than that defined by Soviet doctrine. The East
European officers who matriculate through this system later
work alongside their Soviet counterparts in the command
structure of the Alliance, These East European officers
then receive ample opportunity for professional and social
favoritism, from the Soviet military hierarchy. In fact, the
East European graduates of Voroshilov, particularly those
graduated with honors, appear to enjoy a virtual monopoly
in the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the posts of defense
ministers, chiefs of staff and chiefs of main political
. . 47 , .
administrations. This is significant since the committee
of defense ministers is considered to be the highest mili-
48tary organization of the alliance. According to figures
published in a 19 74 volume edited by General of the Army
E»E. Mal'^tsev, Commandant of the Lenin Military-Political
Academy, 3 3 percent of the Polish officer corps has a
higher or special technical education. General Jaruzelski
is a graduate of the Voroshilov Academy, as are, it can be
speculated, several of the other ranking senior Polish
military. The exact number of Polish graduates of the
academy can only be theoriz-ed^ However, a recent study by
the RAKD- Corporation indicated that the overall educational
34

level of Polish officers is the highest of the Warsaw Pack
14,9Officer Corps. The report stated: "The Polish Officer
Corps is as well trained as the Soviet officer corps, if not
better trained. In terms of comniand qualifications,
50
capabilities and training, the Soviets and Poles are equal".
In the area of troop training there are two distinct
characteristics to be noted in regard to the Warsaw Pact
exercises. Christopher Jones states that the armed forces
of Poland participated in at least 25 ground forces /combined
arms WTO exercises in the period from 1961-79. Of these 25,
7 were conducted in Poland; 7 were held completely outside
Poland; and 11 were conducted jointly on the territory of
Poland and of the GDR or Czechoslovkia. Of these 2 5 exercises,
commanders can be identified for 21. Of these 21, 6 had
Polish commanders. Of the 15 foreign commanders, 10 were
Soviet officers. Christopher Jones remarks that this pattern
of the location of ground forces /combined arms exercises
reduces the opportunity for national defense ministries to
develop a capability for the conduct of a war in defense of
51
national territory. In addition, the pattern of the
assignment of command reduces the possiblity that the
officers of a given state wiil acquire the experience
necessary to conduct larger-scale combined arms actions in
52defense of their national territory. As Jones, notes
further, this pattern also accustoms, national military




There are several inferences to be drawn from Polish
participation in these WTO exercises. First the actual
frequency of Polish participation is probably higher than
recorded since the WTO does not report all exercises
conducted. Second there is no doubt that these exercises
provide a basic training source to insure unit readiness on
a mass participatory scale. Thirdly, while serving as a
training v^ehicle for combat operations, they undoubtedly
serve, as Jones has noted, as a vehicle to reaffirm Soviet
ultimate command of the forces and thus either discourage
or outright eliminate the thought of the forces functioning
up.der national auspices.
In addition, in the Polish case there occurred in the
mid-seventies an increase in bilateral cooperation between
the members of the Northern Tier with minimal Soviet overt
involvement. There has been an increase in military academy
exchange participation as well as exercises consisting of
Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German forces without the
53presence of Soviet military units. This training
unequivocably reinforces autonomy among the different
members as well as contributing to military readiness.
In summary, the background of the Polish armed forces
since World War II is definitely one that has been
influenced heavily by the Soviet Union, and Poland '^s
participation in the Warsaw Treaty organization. It is,
however, inaccurate to say that this influence has been and
36

will be the factor that dominates aXl of the perfomLance
and actions of the Polish armed forces. It is, of course,
at the same time incorrect to arrive at the opposite
conclusion that the Polish armed forces are as free in their
actions as a West European country. A review of the Polish
armed forces in different postr-World War II crisis




IV. POLISH ARMED. FORCES IN CRISES
The Polish armed forces were used in crisis situations
that arose in 1956, 1968, 1970,, 1976, 1980 and 1981. An
understanding of the role of the armed forces during each
of these crises may suggest a background from which
estimates of current and future reliability can be
projected.
In 19 56 strikes and riots by industrial workers broke
out in Poznan, Local security units were unable to quell
the disturbances. The regular army was called upon but
refused to fire on the strikers,. The result was that elite
security forces from elsewhere were called in to restore
order. The disturbances resulted in the restoration to
power of the once purged party leader, Gomulka. A major
factor explaining the Soviet leadership's acceptance of
Gomulka* s return was the threat of armed Polish resistance
54
against Soviet efforts to prevent it. Gomulka 's reaction
to the movement of Soviet troops close to Warsaw was echoed
in his remarks to Krushchev;
"^L^ve just received a report that some of your forces are
moving toward Warsaw. I ask.. I demand,,, that you order
them to stop and return to their bases. If you don'^t
something terrible and irreversible will happen, **^^
With respect to the Polish army it was internally
(Xixtded. between the Soviet generals, headed by Rokossowski,
and lower ranking Polish officers sympathetic to Gomulka;
38

as a result, on a large scale it was neutralized and
remained in its barracks. Despite this overall
neutralization, some forces under the leadership of General
Komar organized a Committee for the Defense of Warsaw and
57prepared to resist the approaching Soviets, In addition
Admiral Jan Wisniewski, Commander of coastal defense units
and General Jan Frey-'-Bielecki, an Air Force unit commander,
prepared their units for armed resistance. This partial
mobilization of Polish armed forces had the effect on the
Sov^iets of reconsidering the act of exercising armed , i-
intervention, Krushchev himself recounted:
"As we began to calculate which Polish regiments we could
count on to obey Rokossovsky, the situation began to look
somewhat bleak. "58
Thus, in 1956, the operational army failed to be effective in
an internal defensive role and the elite security force had to
be called upon. However, the action of the Armed Forces who
demonstrated the will to resist a possible Soviet invasion
displayed a credible if not totally capable external
defensive force. Even though they could not have defeated
the Soviet advance, they could have displayed some resistance
and, as has been noted, this was not taken lightly by
Krushchev^,
The Polish armed forces invplv-ement in the Czechoslovak
invasion of 19S8 is a different story* It is estimated that
some 50,000 Polish operational, army soldiers participated in
59 . .
the Soviet-led invasion. Since there was no opposition
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to the invaders by the Cz.echs, the argument is frequently
set forth that this venture was not a true test of Warsaw
Pact troop effectiveness and reliability. This is true.
However, the fact remains that, in the case of the Poles,
East Germans , Hungarians and. Bulgarians there was no
pre- intervention guarantee that there would not be blood
shed. The risk of confrontation was undertaken and this
in itself is significant » It must be mentioned in examining
the Polish participation that this use of Polish armed forces
was the first and only use to date in a semi-hostile action
outside Polish soil. The Polish operational army thus
demonstrated its capability to be used in an external offensive
role.
In 19 7 the military acted in an internal repressive mode
against the worker strikes. The operational army backed the
security police but refused to use immediate and overwhelming
fi nforce as ordered. During this situation the military
leadership refused to act on ""uncoordinated orders" , according
to Defense Minister Jaruzelski. The operational army had
thus stood partly aside in a situation of local unrest and
national leadership squabbling* A. Ross Johnson aptly
describes the situation:
"^This- course of action doubtless derived from a conviction
by the military elite that the regular forces could not be
used for mass repression of their fellow countrymen **•. By
opting for non-involvement, the military played something
of the role of silent kingmaker v The precedent was that a
Party leader challenged, by Party opponents in a domestic
crisis cannot count on the army to save his position, "°-'-
4:0

Thus, the use of the operational army in an internal defensive
mode failed. This theme was to be re-enacted in the riots of
1976, The military leadership is reported to have played a
moderating role. The following words of Jaruzelski at the
time support this tenet, ^^Pplish soldiers will not shoot
K 9
Polish workers".
The crises occurring in 19 8 0-19 81 were to strike a bit
different tune. The military in person of General Jaruzelski
was playing an ever-increasing role in the government. The
Polish Communist Party began to be slowly militarized as
General Jaruzelski and senior military officers assumed key
positions, Polish security forces were used to quell civil
disturbances throughout this period and they were backed by
operational azTiiy forces. There was a difference now,
however, because the real locus of power had shifted from
the party-controlled government to a military-controlled
government. The previous problems of conflicting orders to
the troops as a result of factional political differences
had disappeared. These two facts alone strengthened the
image of the operational army and permitted it to function
successfully now in an internal defensive role. The military
had arrived at a hitherto unseen position for an Eastern Bloc
country at the very top of national control. General
Jaruzelski '^s imposition of ma.rtial law had been most
probably thought out. for several months. Operational army
units had been dispatched throughout the country to reinforce

ZOMO control of certain areas. The actual implementation
of martial law on 12 December 1981 saw the security forces
ZOMO doing the dirty work. The operational army did in
fact back these forces. One recent visitor to Poland has
commented on the total controls these forces seem to exact
in a stealthful but effective manner. It is popular
opinion that these special security forces have higher pay
and more prequisites. One recent visitor ventured to state
that these forces have access to narcotics and alcohol to
64
exact their unquestionable compliance with orders . While
this cannot be confirmed, it implies that these security
forces need more than the renumeration as regular opera-
tional army types to do their job for the commanding military
Herein lies a paradox in that these ZOMO troops enforce the
ruling military will be seemingly have to be specially
treated to do so while the rest of the regular operational
army stands behind them. It may be that the operational
army is figuratively several steps behind these troops but,
nevertheless, they are there. Thus, in the most recent
crises that have confronted the Polish armed forces there
has been a successful response to the internal defensive
role but yet a close analysis of this response reveals two
groups of soldiers, on the one hand the highly responsive
security types and on the other the operational army which
seems to respond effectively but with just a little
42

hesitation. One explanation of this may, in fact, be that
General Jaruzelski, in order to achieve his maintenance of
power, has not chosen to place the operational military in
any outright extended popular conflict role which would risk
the possibility of non-compliance with orders and alieniation
by the public but rather has wisely chosen to employ the
ZOMO forces in the up^-vfrontconfrontations , By following
this tactic he preserves the reputation of the operational
armed forces as well as mollifying as best he can popular
opinion with respect to the ruling military. Jaruzelski
surely realizes the potential for bloody confrontation that
can occur between the populace and the army, the result of
which can achieve no meaningful beneficial end for himself
or his country.
Another aspect of the political crises of the early
eighties in Poland was the threat of an invasion by the
Soviet Union. The Soviets did mobilize on two occasions,
but no invasion occurred. There are many contributions to
this Soviet decision not to use armed intervention but one
related to the subject at hand is that the Soviets did fear
armed resistance from the Polish populace if an invasion
force entered Poland. The Soviets no doubt remembered the
situation of 19 56 when Khrushchev was faced with a similar
problem. In addition, there were other factors that would
have contributed to the strength of Polish resistance in
19 8 0/Sl^ The Poles had received warning from the West
• k3

concerriiiig Soviet troop moveiiients. Thus the Soviets would have
faced armed resistance without the benefit of surprise.
Furthermore, the use of Warsaw Pact forces against Poland
would have added two further difficulties. The hatred of the
Poles for the Germans would have certainly resulted in fierce
Polish reaction to the onslaught of East German troops on
Polish soil* In addition, the very reputation of the Poles
as armed resistors is recorded by a history of struggle for
survival between powerful German and Russian neighbors..
The anti^Russian insurrections of 183 and 186 3 offer good
examples of this. The Poles also fought bravely against the
Soviet regime in 1920-21, and during . World War II they
fought against both German and Russian invaders. It is
only speculation how the Polish armed forces would have
been organizied against the Soviets, but the fact remains that
the threat of popular armed resistance contributed to the
Soviet decision not to invade.
An overview of the Polish Armed Forces in crisis situa-
tions reveals a pattern of behavior as outlined on the
following matrix. In terms of the utility of the operational
armed forces in suppressing domestic dissent a negative track
R R
record appears. The military has not been used as the
solution to correct the political or economic problems
which caused each domestic crisis. It has been the security
forces, acting immediately and confronting the populace.
ittt

Although, as previously discussed, the armed forces appear
to be waiting in the wings, it is the security forces who
squelch the unrest.
The actions of the military, i.e,, restraint and refusal to
participate in violence, allowed the armed forces to stay
apart from the political failures in the country and thus
ma.intain a separate sense of autonomy. The military did,
however, demonstrate its ability, albeit not actually put to a
combat test in their involvement in showing resistance to the
Soviets in 19 5 6 and in deploying troops with the Warsaw Treaty
Organiza.tion invasion force in Czechoslovakia in 195 8, As
A, Ross Johnson states:.
"^In emphasizing the primacy of its external security
functions, in recognizing that it does not command a
viable instrument of mass internal repression, and in
wishing to remain as uninvolved as possible in
controversieG within the party elite, the Polish
military leadership has become a significant factor in
Polish Communist politics ,'^^'
It was this strength that the military developed that was
embodied in General Jaruzelski'^s rising through the party
and regime structure to ultimate control of the country. The
history of the Polish Armed Forces actions up to 19 8
conditioned it for its takeover of the government. The Army
was unscarred by the political squabbling and failures of the
governinent , The Army was the only domestic group outside the
Catholic Church hierachy that was still an operable, viable






EVENT SECURITY FORCES ARKED FORCES RESULT
1956 Local failed refused to use elite security used/
outside brought in violence order restored
government changed
1970 Local used would not use order restored
violence government changed
19 76 Local used soldiers won'^t order restored
shoot
198 0- Local used military backed order restored
81 but avoided government changed
confrontat ion
In sumriLary , the Polish armed forces various responses in
cri-ses; have evolved to the level that now the party and
government have been dissolved and replaced by military rule.
The military has assumed dominance in all aspects of national
power control in the country. The action of the military
has put a sudden halt to the replacement of governments that
took place in 19 56, 1970, 1980. This idea of "Bonapartism"
or undue influence of the military has conquered and superceded
all else. Now in this regard the Polish armed forces work
directly for their military leader who is governing the nation.
History has shown that the operational armed forces will
follow the orders of their military leaders. In each of the
crises discussed, it was ultimately the orders of the
military leaders that preva;iled. Thus then the assumption
can be put. forward with confidence that the operational
AS

armed forces of Poland wij.1 follow the orders of their
present government regime which is the military. In addition
this regime also controls all the natural security forces
which, when added to the operational armed forces,
constitutes all the comtat forces of Poland, The implication
is that now all the Polish combat forces under control of the
government will respond to its orders.
47

V, THE BURDEN OF GOVERN"ING
The military in Poland now carries the burden of
governing the nation. In any analysis of reliability this
awesome task must be reviewed in terms of how it detracts
from the operational readiness of the armed forces doing the
governing. The issue becomes that of attempting to evaluate
the impact of the disruption on the Polish Armed Forces.
The major disruption is largest in the ranks of the officer
corps. At the start, however, it must be noted that there
are essentially two branches of the Polish officer corps,
i,e,, the combat and non-combat units.
Overall, only 2 5 to 3 percent of Polish officers
serve in combat units; the remaining 7 to 7 5 percent serve in
military administration, military training schools, etc.
The majority of these non-combat officers are of senior rank.
In this regard ninety percent or more of the military
commissars have been nominated not from combat units but from
military/technical academies such as the Dabrowski Military
69
Academy in Warsaw, which alone provided 800 commissars.
Hence, since this academy typifies the source of the majority
of officers called to serve in civilian posts this has not




The weakening in readiness has been a result of the
fact that since August 19 8 the military training program
in combat units has been implemented only at 5 percent
70
maximum. Since the imposition of martial law in
December 19 81 Polish combat units have taken part in all
kinds of domestic military operations.
The military has been assigned three tasks: assault,
71blockade and logistical support, A breakdown of these
assignments is as follows i internal defense forces together
with Z-OMO and militia have been assigned assault; the
operational combat divisions have been assigned blockade
tasks where they were not directly confronting the populace;
ther territorial defense forces were assigned logistical
support. In essence then none of these forces, with the
exception of some internal forces, have executed their normal
training programs. Furthermore, a large portion of all of
these forces are in a broad sense in use as aforementioned,
ultimately supporting the military regime in its governing
capacity.
In essence the burden of governing has unequivocally caused
a decrease in the readiness of Polish Armed forces. Many of
the fifteen divisions of the Polish army are, as previously
stated, at less than 50 percent of their training capability.
What Is more significant is the fact "that if war were to
break out tomorrow, Poland would not. be in a position to send
72
all fifteen divisions outside its borders. Some units
tt9

would have to stay behind to support the gov^erning
regime in various areas as discussed.
This decrease in military readiness is a source of
frustration to some members of the military, Disgruntlement
and discontent have surfaced mainly at the lower levels of
the officer corps. The discontent is both professional
reflecting the feeling that combat capability cannot be
maintained if officers spend their time inspecting and
73political because the army'^s new role is unpopular.
Amongst the more junior military personnel resentment of the
role they find themselves playing is vented in urban
i^icidents and verbal abuse directed at the ZOMO and internal
74
securi.ty personnel.
While the burden of governing taxes the military
institution of Poland from a combat readiness aspect, it
profoundly challenges the military leader General Jaruzelski.
With the make-up of the Polish Armed Forces as previously
discussed, almost two thirds conscripts, he cannot afford to
place the operational troops in direct confrontation with the
populace, Jaruzelski realizes that it is essential that he
retain the power to command the Armed Forces, The reliability
of the Armed Forces to obey Jaruzelski is why he cannot risk
issuing them orders which could result otherwise. As a member
of the ruling elite under three- successive leaders, Gomulka,
Girek,. and Kania, he has learned, fpom their failures*
50

In short, Jaruzelski must keep the lid on Poland with a
reliable military power base. There are a number of combined
and independent segments of the Polish populace that could
seriously jolt, or even ultimately upset, his power base,
i,e,, actually cause, or in the aggregate contribute to
causing, the Armed Forces not to carry out the will of their
leader. Each of these segments JaruzLelski must deal with.
These segments are: the Party, the Church, the intelligentsia,
the police, the peasants and the workers. Jaruzelski ^s
tactics in forcing these segments of the population into some
kind of mutual coexistence with his regime is his goal at a
mifiimum. It must be noted that each of these groups
iatermeshes with the armed forces in one way or another.
For purposes of further reviewing the reliability issue of
the Armed Forces, a brief examination of how Jaruzelski will
handle, or is handling, each of these groups is appropriate.
In the case of the Communist Party, Jaruzelski has, in
effect, replaced it with his military council government.
He has not, nor will he probably in the near future, force
the ideological creed of communism on the Polish populace
or for that matter on the Polish Armed Forces. Subtle
restraint in this area will probably be his best tactic.
As for a relationship with the Church, he also must
show restraint but in this regard the Chruch'^s advocacy of
P-03;i-.viplence plays right into his hands of not having to
expose his military power- base to a major- confrontation. As
.51

a product of the ruling elite class of Poland, Jaruz.elski
is intelligent and educated* Although he is a military man,
he cultivates intellectuals. Unlike Gomulka or Gierek, he
7 5
surrounds himself with scholars and experts. As a recent
Rand study concluded, Jaruzelski, however, is cautious: "He
likes intellectuals and keeps an open mind in a sense. If
new ideas conflict with the business of running the country,
he always opts instinctively for the security side of a
situation", _ . _. _
In his tactics to maintain a solid military power base
Jaruz-elski employs the security forces in the form of ZOMO
,
militia and police. These are the units that confront the
populace head on in the streets when necessary and not the
operational army. Jaruzelski wants the image of the military
to be preserved. As A, Ross Johnson states: the military
represent the nation, as opposed to ZOMO, which represents
77the state.
In further effort to maintain control, Jaruzelski must
and does seem to recognize the link between his largely
conscript armed forces and their source--namely the peasants
and the workers. To avoid major d isgruntlement he must avoid
the price hikes and food shortages and he must succeed in
placating the workers. In this regard it is significant that
the Polish Politburo has just ordered state administrative and
economia bodies to consult properly with the. new government
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initiated unions on all matters of economic planning and wage
7 8policy. Jaruzelski'^s dealings with the trade unions could
be discussed at length and such would be well beyond the scope
of this analysis but the essential point is that he must deal
with them to safeguard his military power base.
It is ironic that in safeguarding his power base by
taking into account and dealing with the aforementioned
domestic segments of the populace, Jaruzelski assures a
cohesive Armed Forces available as a Warsaw Pact member.
While a detailed analysis of the Soviet viewpoint is not now
appropriate, the overall result of Jaruzelski ^s efforts
when successful is to present a reliable number of divisions,
although in a decreased state of readiness but still available
to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and ultimately to the Soviet
Uniop.. Of course, it reamins a subjective judgment as to
whether these troops would, in total, effectively fight as
Warsaw Treaty members. Objectively speaking, however, the
more firmly established is Jaruzelski '^s military base and the
freer it is from domestic threat, the more it becomes viably




The notion of Polish Bonapartism was alluded to earlier,
but must be reviewed again in terms of its hearing on the
reliability of the Polish armed forces in responding to Warsaw
Treaty Organization commands. It is A. Ross Johnson who
applies the term ^^Bonapart ism"- to the Polish military regime.
The term and its implications are applied and discussed by
Johnson and his Rand Associates in their treatment of the
Polish question. Their workship conference held in October
1982 addressed this subject, (See Rand N-2001 AF in end note
40,)
. First of all the term "Bonapartism" must be defined. The
label of "Bonapartism" is, of course, derived from the period
of the French Revolution when Napoleon subverted the military
to his own purposes. For purposes of this analysis it is a
label that implies undue military influence in the national
government for purposes of self aggrandizement. This perception of
the military '•s only ruling purpose as self serving is the key
issue. Furthermore, it is the eyes of the perceiver that
matter most. More specifically, do the Soviets view the Polish
military regime as potentially vulnerable to a type of
"Bonapartism?" In so posing this question the Western
observer may be able to reach some useful assessment of the
^Bonapartist"^ possibilities in terms of advantage to the West.
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In order to attempt to estimate the Soviet viewpoint, it
is necessary to examine the Soviet view of the relationship
of the armed forces and the military, Soviet military
writing states that Marxist-Leninism teaches that the
socialist armed forces are a special organ of the state, that
they contain within themselves features characteristic of the
given given state, and are part of its political superstrue
-
79ture. This political superstructure is controlled strictly
by the state. General William Odom, who served as the military
specialist on the staff of President Carter ^s National Security
Council, concludes that "the Soviet military is an adminis-
trative arm of the Party, not something separate from and
8
competing with it". There is, however, more to it than the
armed forces simply existing as an administrative arm as General
Odom states. The Soviet analysts Harriet and William Scott
are closest to the issue when they say, "no other organization
in the Soviet Union is as watched and corrected by the Party
8
1
leadership as the Soviet Armed Forces"
,
The Red Army has played a significant role in the politics
of the Russian state of this century. The Red Army was
originally the instrument by which the Bolsheviks crushed
8 2
their rivals in the Civil War that followed the Revolution,
Since that time, as Andrew Cockburn states, there have been
a number of instances wh.en the military has intervened
decisively in power struggles within the political establishment
It was units of the armed forces under the command of Marshals
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Zhukov and Koniev who were brought to Moscow to counter
the threat of Beria'-s guard of KGB troops in 19 53, It
was Zhukov again who came to Khrushchev^ s aid in 1957 when
a so-r.called "anti-Party group" of the. latter ^s rivals
mustered a majority on the Poliburo to oust him. While
the two previously mentioned examples are highly
dramatic it can be suggested that the last three established
Soviet leaders, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev: followed
a pattern in their rise to their preeminent position in the
Sov^iet hierarchy. Each played for and secured the support
of the military industrial complex while consolidating
84his power and edging out formidable political rivals.
Further proof of the emergence of the military to a
position of preeminence occurred in 19 7 3 as the Soviet Central
Committee named three new full members to its Poliburo,
Chairman of the KGB, Andropov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gromyko and Minister of Defense Grechko , Grechko*s
appointment marked only the second time in Soviet history
that the armed forces were represented in the Poliburo, the
highest decision making organ in the Soviet system by a
8 5professional military man. No less noteworthy is that
Andropov^s appointment ma.rked the first full Poliburo
membership for the head of the secret police since Beria'^s
execution ia, 1953, (As an aside, it should be noted that
Andropov^'^s KGB of which he was the. head is a full member of
the Soviet Armed Forces^ While the duties of the many
. 5S

departments of the KGB vary, the KGB force possesses its own
ships, tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, light
8 R
aircraft and other modern weaponary, ) Thus with these two
Poliisuro appointments in essence it may be suggested that
a transfer of the military influ^ence to party leadership
occurred.
The influence of the military continued. In a speech
delivered to the Party "^s Central Committee, which elected
him to the First Secretaryship, Andropov gave a clear
indication that his consolidation of power was to follow
the same pattern as that of his predecessors:
^^We know well that the imperialists will never meet one^s
pleas for peace, it can only be defended by relying on
the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces, "87
Writing shortly afterward about the circumstances of the
Andropov takeover, Dusko Doder, the Moscow correspondent of
the Washington Post wrote "the backing of the armed forces
J • • ft 8 8was deciLsive",
With this influence of the military in the current Soviet
regime in focue , their perception of the Polish military
governing regime should be viewed in a new light. In Poland,
as stated previously, the military has replaced the Party.
A type of military communism now exists. In any Bolshevik
89
system the Party is supposed to control the gun. It is not
that the Polish army holds the gun on the Party but rather
that the Party no longer seems to exist as a governing force.
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There are several ways to interpret this Polish situation.
One is that ostensibly the ideological tie of the Communist
Party in Poland to the other Communist Parties of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization may have been dealt a severe disruption.
The Communist Party system by definition accepts the hegemony
of the Party in Moscow, This all-important wedge so to speak
that the Soviet Union controls and wields in Eastern Europe
to nudge the populace, the military and the local governments,
may be weakened in Poland, The question then arises as to how
reliable the Polish response could be to join a Communist-
motivated combat operation. There are two aspects to this
issue. One is that the Polish populace, who by vast majority
were not Party members, and who, by and large, make up almost
two-thirds of the operational Armed Forces, certainly will be
even less eager to support Communist -motivated use of armed
forces.
The second aspect that counters and over shadows this
fact is that the present regime, led by Jaruzelski, has
repeatedly avowed its allegiance to the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation. In mid-summer 19 81 Jaruzelski acknowledged:
"Brotherhood- in-arms with the Soviet Army, allied ties with
the Warsaw Treaty states ,, .this is a historic achievement
of our army and of our people, the foundation of security
90
and peaceful development of socialist Poland,."^ When
martial law was declared several months later General
Jaruzelski. again in his 13 December 19 81 speech reaffirmed
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Polish allegiance: "The Polish-Soviet alliance is and will
remain the cornerstone of the Polish raison d^etat, the
guarantee of the credibility of our borders,,., Poland is,
and will remain a lasting, link in the Warsaw Pact, an
91
unfa-3-ling member of the Socialist community of nations,"
In conclusion given the aforementioned statements of the
Polish military regime and in view of the current position of
preeminence that the professional military plays in the
Soviet regime it can be suggested that the label of
"Bonapartism" would not be attached to Poland by the Soviets
and furthermore may be quite a misnomer.
In addition, in support of this thesis it may be contended
that the "Bonapartism" issue serves only to favor the
reliability of the Polish armed forces in the eyes of today's
Kremlin leaders, who, themselves influenced by the military,
from time to time have been known to don marshal 's uniforms.
In fact the emergence of the military as a governing force




One of the major contributors to the political instability
in Poland has been the poor shape of the Polish economy.
While this thesis is not intended to explore in depth the
reasons for economic failure in Poland it is appropriate
to review Polish defense expenditures and defense industries
to examine their status and support for the COMECON/Warsaw
Treaty Organiz.ation, Two basic questions arise: whether
Poland will continue sufficient defense expenditure to
support its Armed Forces as in the past and, at the same
time, whether it will continue to be a source of certain
types of military hardware for Warsaw Treaty members
,
Poland has had the highest percent of defense expenditure
of the state budget of all Northern Tier countries. Figure
92
2 illustrates this.
There are, in fact, two facets of the Polish defense
economic question, i,e,, the ability of the Poles to sustain
their armed forces and their ability to sustain the overall
Polish military-industrial program. The official Polish
defense budget available for Western scrutiny still probably
does not cover all areas but it can serve as a point of
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PUBLISHED DATA ON GROWTH OF POLAND "^S DEFENSE SPENDING




Total Increase Percent (% increase.
Cbil, zl,) (bil, Z.1,) Increase 1961 prices)
1951 3.8 _ _ _
1952 6,6 2,8 73,7 5,5
1953 10,3 3,7 56,0 10,5
1954 10,9 0.5 5,8 10,0
1955 12.5 1,7 15,5 8,7
1956 12,7 0.1 0,8 7,2
1957 10.1 -2,6 -20.5 10,8
1958 11,2 1,1 10,9 5.5
1959 14,3 3,1 27,7 5,2
1960 14,9 0,5 4.2 4,5
1951 17,0 2.1 14,1 7.5
1952 18,4 1.4 8,2 2,2
1963 20,7 2,3 12.5 7,2
1954: 21.5 0,9 4,3 6,7
1965 23.2 1.6 7,4 5.9
1956 25,2 2,0 8.6 7.2
1967 26.4 1.2 4.8 5.6
1968 30.3 3.9 14,8 9.0
1969 33.5 3,2 10,6 2.8
1970 35,7 2.2 5.6 5.2
1971 37.2 1,5 4,2 8.1
1972 39.9 2.7 7,2 10.5
1973 41,1 1,2 3,0 10.8
1971^ 45,5 4.4 10,7 10,4
1975 47,6 2.1 4.5 9.0
1975 51.7 4,1 8,6 5,8
1977 57.7 5,0 11,6 5,9
1978 59,8 2,1 3,5 3.0
1979 64,3 4,5 7.5 -2,3
1980 54.5 0,1 0,3 -5,0
Source:. Calculated from the Rooz^nik Statystyczny (Statistical
Yearbook), Warsaw, for differeny years.
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As can be seen, officially reported expenditures have
increased year to year. This trend continued without regard
for Poland's deteriorating economic situation. In 19 81,
defense spending increased about another U.S. $34 5 million
—
in a country with a foreign debt of U,S, $2 5-26 billion, a
totally disorganized domestic market, and a high inflation
94
rate. One Polish source argues that approval of 7 5 million
additional Zlotys for investment in the very difficult year
of, 19 81 derived solely from the need to continue modernization
95
of the arms industry.
In comparison with the rest of Eastern Europe, Poland
shows, a faster growth in military expenditures than any
other country except Bulgaria as the following table
indicates
,
Poland plays a significant role in the Eastern Bloc arms
trade industry. In the period 1975-79, Poland exported
weapons and military equipment valued at approximately U.S.
$1,400 million, ^"^ In the eleven years from 1969-1979,
Poland*-s imports and exports of armament and military equip-
ment totaled about U.S. $2,84 million and U.S. $2,4 5
million, respectively, representing a cumulative negative
9 8
trade balance of about U,S, $390 million. With this
negative arms trade balance Pplan.d was tasked not only with
high military expenditures but also with the obligation to
finance its. net arms imports with a large portion of its
99
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arms exports go to the biggest customers, namely the Soviet
Union, the GDR and Romania. Thus, Poland seemingly has
sustained material supply of her share of armaments to the
Northern Tier forces.
With the status of the present Polish overall economy it
would seem likely that there would start to be a decrease in
Polish production and economic support for all defense expen-
ditures. To date there has been no significant evidence to
support this. There are several probable reasons for no
change appearing. The first is that the foreign debt of
$25 billion to the West has been rescheduled over twenty
years, with an eight year grace period during which no
interest is due. The Polish repayment schedule is a
complex one as recently worked out by Western banks at a
conference in Bonn in August 198 3, but the overall result
is that Western banks have given Poland further leeway for
economic survival. The ironic fact is that this economic
leeway indirectly supports the Polish responsibilities in the
areas of defense expenditures within the Warsaw Pact. The
Soviets also have given Poland periodic monetary assistance
which at best has been difficult to ascertain the exact
amount. In addition to this outside assistance the
Jaruzelski regime has taken a basic theme of austerity and





In essence, the Polish economy, ostensibly wealc as it
is by Western standards, has not failed in the area of
defense support and therefore seems to have had presently




There are, in fact, many nuances to the Catholic Churches
role in the present political and economic dilemmas in Poland,
However, to relate the Church *^s role to the issue of the
reliability of the Polish Armed forces the most significant
contribution the Church is presently making can be
interpreted, very broadly as one of stability and assistance.
The nonr-violent theme advocated by the Church has been
discussed previously, but what has not been discussed is the
Churches new role in the agricultural assistance area.
Significant moves have already been made on an international
level by the Roman Catholic Church to raise some $1,9 billion
102through Western churches for a development program, A
recent church visitor to Poland in consultation with Vatican
representatives and the Polish Primate Cardinal Glemp
indicate that this agricultural assistance program could be
103
one of the keys in increasing the food supply. There
has, to date, been little published about the program*
s
results.
In essence then the Church *^s contribution of aiding
stability ufider the regime by these efforts is an indirect
contribution to the regim.e'^s success in majlntaining its
5iilitary power base intact* Should the agriculture
assistance program really get off the ground the result
67

could be a beginning of an end to the basic food associated
problems of the populace, aj-beit temporary or not. Thus, in
an. ironic way the Church will serve to strengthen the military
of Poland.
In addition to the factors that have been discussed up to
this point in the analysis, there remains a conglomeration of
in.ter-<^related and unrelated issues that both contribute to
and detract from reliability. These factors will be briefly
discussed in the next two chapters of this thesis.
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IX. FACTORS FA\rORIN'G RELIABILITY
The following factors either reiterate previously
discussed, issues or introduce- new areas. Each of these
serves to support the premise that Polish armed forces are
and will, be a reliable asset of the Warsaw Pact,
T^-^Post World War II historical formation of the Polish
Armed Forces reflects a strong Soviet influence,
. —The Polish Armed Forces are the most modern and largest
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military force.
-^The Polish military elite is and has been closely
linked with the Soviet military elite. Tactically the Polish
forces have adopted the role envisaged for them as members of
the Warsaw Pact, They have trained and improved the Polish
Armed Forces accordingly,
—Polish military theorists have significantly contri-
buted to the Warsaw Pact coalition warfare doctrine,
—Military equipment in the Warsaw Pact by and large has
become standardized,
--Sufficient significant force training with the Soviets
has taJcen place. As Thomas Wolfe states;
"^the consensus among most Western observers is that the
non'-'Soviet jPact forces opposing. NATO in the central region
can be expected to meet standards of combat capability and
readiness not greatly below those that characterize the ^^r
Soviet Union "^s own theater, forc-es- in the European arena.
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—The Poles participated with 5 0,000 troops in the
Warsaw Pact invasion of Cz^echo Slovakia in 1968,
—Poland still plays a significant role in the Eastern
Eloc arms trade industry,
-T-Geographically , the Poles are in a difficult dilemma.
If they opted out of the Soviet camp, the chances are that
the combat would take place on their own turf. The flat
1 n fi
Polish plain is like a tunnel to Russia.
—In amplification of the geographic dilemma facing the
Poles, all the Soviets need at a minimum is access to Polish
real estate, without resistance, to effect an attack on NATO.
In essence all the Poles would have to do is simply be
reliable enough to allow the Soviets the real estate access
unopposed.
—^There is a traditional threat to Poland from the
Germans, Polish fear of the Germans could facilitate
cooperation with Soviet desires to launch a Warsaw Pact
attack on the Federal Republic of Germany,
--"Change (196 9) in the Warsaw Pact command structure could
be interpreted as granting the East Europeans a greater role
in decision making.
—Soviet control over Poland 's forces, through "inte-
gration" of- command, makes it. likely that the Poles could
"aontribute effectively and. reliably to at least the initial
107
phaises of- a Soviet offensive, against Western Europe*"
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—Reinforcing the above factor is the premise that the
quickness of deployment of Polish troops under the Warsaw
Pact banner will increase the probability of their
reliability. Early successes also will further enhance it.
-^'-Current Western military analysts have attributed more
and more credibility and respect to the Soviet military's
adoption and implementation of the Operational Manoeuvre
Group as a serious challenge to RATO , The Manoeuvre Group
as C»N» Donnelly writes "^is not an end in itself, but a tool
to assist the rapid advance of the Warsaw Pact main forces
"I no
and. hence achieve a more rapid end to the war," This
new Soviet doctrine will enhance Warsaw Pact troop reliability
for the short term assault,
'
—There has been stability in the Polish military elite
since 197 3,
'
—The presence of two Soviet divisions in Poland as well
as close to twenty in East Germany and four in Czechoslovakia
serve to remind the Poles of Soviet dominance.
-
—The Polish military elite lobbies with their counter-
. . . . 109parts in the Soviet military to receive new equipment.
--The Church '^s advocation of non-violence has indirectly
strengthened the governing military regime.
11

X. FACTORS OPPOSING. RELIABILITY
The following factors serve to support the premise that
the Polish armed forces would be of questionable reliability
to the Warsaw Pact
,
-o-The modern officer corps has evolved in Poland at the
expense of ideological training, emphasizing highly
110developed military skills and specialization.
—The Polish military has partially revived its tradi-
tional ethos as the guardian of national Polish interests
ajx(X has- achieved a degree of institutional integrity that
violates Leninist conceptions of Party control of the armed
111forces. The military now is the dominating factor,
rather than the party,
T-'-The modernization of the Polish armed forces and the
greater professionalizat ion of the officer corps have created
rising professional expectations vis-a-vis the Soviet
military. The Soviet military still fails to give Polish
strategists credit for contributions to the coalition
warfare doctrine. In addition there is dissatisfaction on
the part of the Poles for the delay experienced in receiving
the most advanced Soviet weapons systems,
<
—The threat of West German irredentism has faded. The
Polish-West German Treaty of December. 1970 gave de facto
- 72

recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany to Poland's
post-war frontier on the Oder^^Keisse Rivers,
—Traditional enemies of the Poles are the Russians and
Czechoslovaks as well as Germans,
—The Polish Armed Forces have, not entered actual combat
outside their homeland. The 195 8 invasion of Czechoslovakia
met no resistance.
—Seventy-three percent of the Polish Army consist of
conscripts. These con-scripts generally lack commitment to
Soviet interests,
—The Polish military elite has evolved into a highly
educated force that has demonstrated its moderating influ-
ence domestically. It may be difficult for the Soviets to
rally these strongly nationalistic elites to fight with
Polish troops in a cause that may be solely in the Soviet
interest,
—Many of the fifteen divisions of the Polish army are




It is difficult at best to arrive at a definitive evalua-
tioa as to when and where the reliability of the Polish armed
forces will be strongest and where it might fail. Weighing
the principal factors that may serve as determinants of
reliability is a subjective task, but all the determinants in
the aggregate will decide whether the Polish armed forces can
be relied upon as Warsaw Pact members . Furthermore , in
some cases these determinants are time-related and scenario-
dependent. Hence attempting to simplify the question any
further and arriving at a decision once and for all on their
reliability would not accurately represent the nature of
the subject. Several conclusions on the subject are, however,
worth further consideration as guidelines in evaluating
present and future Polish armed forces reliability. These
conclusions are as follows
:
1, The Polish United Workers Party (the would-be Soviet
wedge) has been relegated to a secondary role in government
leadership, which may leave the ideological reliability of
Poland with the Warsaw Pact coujxtries in some question,
2, With the army as the government, party factional
squabbling has become, less, visible,. . No civilians are giving
c.onf"lictiag orders to the troops » The army, to date, has
obeyed its. leaders' and probably will continue to do so in
7tt

the future. General Jaruzelski and his colleagues seem
to have formed a solid senior military officer consensus,
3» The post World War II formation and training of the
Polish- armed forces has been distinctly pro-Soviet, The
philosophy, training and strategy of the Warsaw Pact is
firmly fixed in the Polish armed forces,
4r, Soviet hegemony in the Eastern Bloc, even in
Poland, probably would be successful in a lightening
utilization of Polish forces for a limited time,
5, The burden of governing has degraded the readiness
of the Polish armed forces. Many of the fifteen divisions
of the Army are at less than 5 percent of their optimal
operational capability. Furthermore, if war were to break
out tomorrow, Poland would not be in a position to send all
fifteen divisions outside its borders. Some units would
have to stay behind to support the governing regime in
various areas
,
5, As the situation in the government becomes stable
and slowly demilitarizes, the burden of governing on the
mi-litary institution will lighten. The size and indoctrinated
training of forces and the geostrategic location of Poland
will probably then contribute to an upward trend in the
proficiency of the Polish forces, as Warsaw Pact members.
7, The Polish economy, ostensibly weak as it is by
Westej?n atandards, has. not. failed in the area of defense
- 15

support and therefore seems to have had little negative
effect on the Polish armed forces to date,
8» At present even with the many existing arguments
against reliability, the Polish armed forces must be
raoked second in reliability in the Soviet camp of the
JTorthern tijer behind East Germany, In terms of the sheer
siz.e
,
geostrategic importance and training of the Poles it
dictates that they must be ranked ahead of Czechoslovakia
and members of the Southern Tier.
9, The government situation in Poland is still not
totally stable or free from even drastic change. The
apparent termination of martial law may spark the start
of a return to normalcy, but the situation remains less
than entirely predictable. The armed forces about which
the present government is centered will no doubt be
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